Partisan Offensive
It’s obvious that Tito was angered by the close and audacious attempt on his life at Drvar. He ordered an increase in operations and offensives to exhaust the enemy. The Drvar operation was the seventh and last German offensive in Yugoslavia. The partisan offensives that month were almost coordinated with the all-out efforts of the Allies in the west and the Soviets in the east to speed up the demise of the Third Reich.
The first units to detect this force were from Aufkl Abt. 13 on the 6th of June. Thus on the 7th, a plan to counter the enemy, Unternehmen Vollmond, was put together.
Unternehmen Vollmond
Plans were based off intel derived from decrypted partisan radio messages. Sauberzweig ordered that the forces mobilize to prevent the enemy from advancing north towards the Majevica-Posavina-Semberija area.
Plan being as follows:
‘1st and 2nd Battalion from 27. SS Regiment to attack south towards Visoka Glava (I/27) and Jasenica (II/27) with support of 2nd Battery located in Donja Trnova.
1st Battalion from 28. SS Regiment to hold heights around Priboj covering position of 6th and 7th Battery and after attack starts it will link up with 4th Battalion from 28. SS Regiment which was in Lopare.’
The general idea was: “assault the enemy from the north and west, pushing him against the Drina.” (Sauberzweig)
It commenced on the early morning of June 8th at 3:45 AM.
SS-Ostuf. Heinz Driesner’s I/28 battalion was moved in position to block the “weaker” forces that in reality was the partisan western column of advance. So, a single battalion with 2 supporting batteries now stood alone in front of the advancing 16th Vojvodina division.
I/28 was made up of fresh recruits, some with zero training. One partisan commander said “The situation was ripe for action.” This was contrary to Sauberzweig’s beliefs, as he assumed the partisans would bypass Lopare and the Priboj area.
German positions:
Driesner’s men made their last stand on the hill southeast of Lopare, and behind them, less than 500 meters, just across the Lopare-Priboj road was 6th Battery of AR 13, and the 7th heavy Battery with four 150mm sFH 18 howitzers. They were located on elevated ground that overlooked the road near the village of Zajednice, just east of Lopare (at the base of hill Brezovacha)
The Attack Begins
Lopare battle from the German perspective. (First hours)
Partisan attack was commenced at 1800 by the 1st Battalion of the 16th Vojvodina. It’s 4th and 5th brigades went straight towards I/28. The 2nd Vj. Brigade was an hour late but it soon joined reinforcing the assault and attacking northwest across Radojevici towards Medenik.
I/28’s mortars were firing danger close to their own men, trying to disorganize the partisan attack, which was now on top of them. Having been overrun, a number of men of the battalion were scattered, some retreated to the positions of the batteries on the hills.
(Two days later, about 500 members of the battered I/28 turned up, the partisans had made a mistake in not pursuing after I/28, and they would soon pay dearly for it at Lopare)
Heinz Rudolph, the commander of the heavy battery, had about 80 men at his disposal. The heaviest of the small arms they possessed to fend off enemy infantry was a single MG42.
Rudolph directing fire for one of his sFH 18 Howitzers.
The howitzers, meant for suppressing the enemy from a distance (in-direct fire) now found themselves shooting directly into the advancing partisans. Shooting about 4-5 shells a minute, which was still painfully slow. The 7th battery was under small arms fire before the 6th (at the village of Brezovaca) because a partisan column bypassed I/28 to east, cut the road to Priboj and was now preparing to attack (2300)
Following a heavy 4 hour firefight with the insurgents and staying true to his artilleryman spirit, Rudolph was the last to leave his howitzers that night. The survivors were out of small arms ammunition, and were now making their way towards the 6th Battery at Brezovaca.
A number of Rudolph’s men were buried on the ground they held.
Just now, was the regimental commander learning of the situation, so he mobilized II/28 to help out.
II/28 was about 30 km away in Srebrenik, they would not get there that night.
It was also soon found out that on the other flank of the battlefield, areas assigned to Regt. 27’s units were far too wide to cover and the enemy forces of the eastern column continued right through them (Regt. 27 was not mobilized soon enough to block the eastern column, it was not in position). Interestingly enough, the local Cetniks, who found themselves in the mess became the only oppostion to most of the partisan column, however they stood no chance and were quickly scattered.
Hitskin.com
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